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1. One's repentance does not necessarily equate to a single act which is never repeated. Even Christians can and do repent of some sin and then repeat it again, even many times. But they repent at each offense and beg for God's forgiveness. (cf. Paul's confession of his struggle after conversion in Rom 7 and 1Jh 1:9,10).

2. It is estimated that a period of 38 to 50 years elapsed between Ninevah's repentance and its invasion of the northern kingdom by the Assyrians.

What do we make of Nineveh's repentance in Jonah? Was it total or partial? It wasn't that many years between their repentance and their invasion of the Northern Kingdom. Their repentance must not have lasted long.

“Deagon feels justified in speaking of a “Christian natural law,” which is rooted in Christian theological convictions and yet is also accessible to non-Christians since it is revealed in nature. Chapter 3 examines the work of several writers—both Christians and non-Christians—who present natural-law theories allegedly independent of whether God exists. Deagon argues that such attempts are ultimately impossible and that these writers have not avoided theology. Natural law theory, he claims, is intrinsically theological and thus never “theologically neutral” (62). In chapter 4, Deagon proposes that the foundational theological principles of love, the true, and the good form the content of Christian natural law….
Part 2 argues that Christian natural law is foundational for religious freedom, understood through these ideas of the good, truth, and love, respectively. In chapter 5, Deagon claims that religious freedom encourages people to pursue the good of religion, whose ultimate end is the beatific vision, that is, intimate eschatological communion with God. Religious freedom, Deagon says, also promotes the common good of our earthly societies by respecting and promoting inherent human dignity. Chapter 6 argues that religious freedom is good because its goal is pursuit of truth, and more specifically of true religion, which is knowledge of God and reconciliation with him. Finally, chapter 7 contends for religious freedom because love does not try to compel people to belief. “Coerced religion is not true or good religion”

Deagon is correct about a number of important big-picture issues, in my judgment. He is right to insist that natural-law theorists cannot avoid certain kinds of theological judgments, even if they avoid speaking about God. God is the creator and upholder of the natural order, after all, and the law it communicates is his. We can be grateful that the content of the natural law—such as the immorality of murder and theft—impresses itself upon non-Christians, and Christians do well to take advantage of that as they participate in moral conversations in public life. But no one can really understand any law without accounting for the authority behind it. One might consider how ridiculous it would be to develop a comprehensive account of American law while trying to remain neutral on whether the United States Congress and Supreme Court actually exist.

Deagon is also correct to note the many important continuities in the natural-law theologies of different Christian traditions. With respect to the medieval theological inheritance, the way early Protestant writers viewed natural law was more similar to how they viewed the doctrine of Christ’s two natures in one person than to how they viewed the doctrine of justification. That is, they thought natural law was a Christian idea they could largely embrace from the earlier tradition without need for major reform. Whether Deagon has too quickly elided Roman Catholic and Reformed versions of natural law, however, is a valid question.

Perhaps most important is that Deagon is correct to defend religious liberty and deserves commendation for taking up the cause.

Nevertheless, several drawbacks impede the book’s overall effectiveness…”